12位顶尖国际事务专家预测：新冠大流行之后，世界将走向何方？

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文章来源：

《外交政策》（Foreign Policy）杂志

中文翻译：

Jennie Yu（Wechat Official Account: itsjennieyu）

导语

3月20日，《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)杂志组织了12位顶尖的国际事务专家讨论新冠疫情对世界的影响，发表题为《新冠大流行之后，世界将走向何方？》一文。

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/

12位国际事务专家涵盖政治、军事、经济、国际组织、公共卫生等领域，“全明星阵容”令人瞩目。以下为12位专家的观点摘要。

1

A World Less Open, Prosperous, and Free

一个更不开放、不繁荣、不自由的世界

Stephen M. Walt，哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院国际事务教授，国际关系的现实主义学派

https://www.flickr.com/photos/ceuhungary/34788129820

The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. COVID-19 will also accelerate the shift in power and influence from West to East. South Korea and Singapore have responded best, and China has reacted well after its early mistakes. The response in Europe and America has been slow and haphazard by comparison, further tarnishing the aura of the Western “brand.”

大流行将加强国家力量和民族主义，也将加速权力和影响力从西方转移到东方。韩国和新加坡的反应最好，而中国在经历了早期的错误之后反应良好。相比之下，欧美的反应缓慢而随意，进一步损害了西方“品牌”的光环。

What won’t change is the fundamentally conflictive nature of world politics. Previous plagues—including the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919—did not end great-power rivalry nor usher in a new era of global cooperation. Neither will COVID-19. We will see a further retreat from hyperglobalization, as citizens look to national governments to protect them and as states and firms seek to reduce future vulnerabilities.

不会改变的是世界政治的冲突本质。先前的瘟疫(包括1918-1919年的流感大流行)并未结束大国之间的竞争，也未迎来全球合作的新时代。这次也不会。随着公民们寻求国家政府的保护，以及各州和企业寻求减少未来的脆弱性，我们将看到“超全球化”的进一步退缩。

2

The End of Globalization as We Know It

为我们所知的全球化的终结

Robin Niblett，英国国际关系专家

https://www.facebook.com/ChathamHouse/photos/robin-niblett-director-of-chatham-house-was-today-awarded-the-companion-of-the-o/10152599369087689/

The coronavirus pandemic could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back of economic globalization. China’s growing economic and military power had already provoked a bipartisan determination in the United States to decouple China from U.S.-sourced high technology and intellectual property and try to force allies to follow suit. Increasing public and political pressure to meet carbon emissions reduction targets had already called into question many companies’ reliance on long-distance supply chains. Now, COVID-19 is forcing governments, companies, and societies to strengthen their capacity to cope with extended periods of economic self-isolation.

COVID-19大流行对于经济全球化而言可能是压倒骆驼的最后一根稻草。中国日益增长的经济和军事实力已经使得美国两党形成一致判断，即要使中国与美国的高科技和知识产权脱钩，并试图迫使其盟友效仿。此外，实现碳减排目标的公共和政治压力日益增强。这迫使政府、公司和社会加强其应对长期的经济自我孤立的能力。

It seems highly unlikely in this context that the world will return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization that defined the early 21st century. And without the incentive to protect the shared gains from global economic integration, the architecture of global economic governance established in the 20th century will quickly atrophy. It will then take enormous self-discipline for political leaders to sustain international cooperation and not retreat into overt geopolitical competition.

在这种情况下，世界似乎极不可能回到定义了21世纪初的互利全球化的概念状态。如果没有动力保护共享利益不受全球经济一体化的影响，那么20世纪建立的全球经济治理架构将迅速萎缩。如此一来，政治领导人将需要极大的自律才能维持国际合作，而非退缩到公开的地缘政治竞争中。

Proving to their citizens that they can manage the COVID-19 crisis will buy leaders some political capital. But those who fail will find it hard to resist the temptation to blame others for their failure.

向公民证明他们可以应对疫情危机，将为领导人带来一些政治资本。但是那些失败的人会发现很难抗拒将失败归咎于他人的诱惑。

3

A More China-Centric Globalization

一个更以中国为中心的全球化

Kishore Mahbubani，新加坡国立大学亚洲研究所研究员，前新加坡驻联合国大使

https://www.flickr.com/photos/worldeconomicforum/6772169889;https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/kishore-mahbubani/has-china-won/9781541768123/

The COVID-19 pandemic will not fundamentally alter global economic directions. It will only accelerate a change that had already begun: a move away from U.S.-centric globalization to a more China-centric globalization.

COVID-19大流行不会从根本上改变全球经济发展方向。它只会加速已经开始的变革，即从以美国为中心的全球化向更加以中国为中心的全球化转变。

Why will this trend continue? The American population has lost faith in globalization and international trade. Free trade agreements are toxic, with or without U.S. President Donald Trump. By contrast, China has not lost faith. Why not? There are deeper historical reasons. Chinese leaders now know well that China’s century of humiliation from 1842 to 1949 was a result of its own complacency and a futile effort by its leaders to cut it off from the world. By contrast, the past few decades of economic resurgence were a result of global engagement.

为什么这种趋势会继续下去？因为美国人对全球化和国际贸易失去了信心。无论有没有特朗普，自由贸易协定都是有毒的。相比之下，中国并没有失去信心。为什么不？有更深的历史原因。中国现在已经知道，从1842年到1949年，中国遭受屈辱的一个世纪是其自身的自满情绪以及当时努力将自身与世隔绝的结果。相比之下，过去几十年的经济复苏是全球参与的结果。

Consequently, as I document in my new book, Has China Won?, the United States has two choices. If its primary goal is to maintain global primacy, it will have to engage in a zero-sum geopolitical contest, politically and economically, with China. However, if the goal of the United States is to improve the well-being of the American people—whose social condition has deteriorated—it should cooperate with China. Wiser counsel would suggest that cooperation would be the better choice. However, given the toxic U.S. political environment toward China, wiser counsel may not prevail.

因此，正如新书《中国赢了吗？》所述，美国有两种选择。如果其主要目标是维持全球主导地位，它将必须与中国在政治和经济上进行零和的地缘政治竞赛。但是，如果美国的目标是改善其社会状况日益恶化的人民的福祉，那么它应该与中国合作。明智的政策顾问会建议，合作将是更好的选择。但是，鉴于美国对华政治环境恶劣，这些明智的政策顾问们可能不会占上风。

4

Democracies Will Come out of Their Shell

民主国家将摆脱困境

G. John Ikenberry，国际关系和美国外交政策专家，普林斯顿大学政治与国际事务教授

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:G._John_Ikenberry_at_the_Miller_Center_Colloquium..jpg

In the short term, the crisis will give fuel to all the various camps in the Western grand strategy debate. Given the economic damage and social collapse that is unfolding, it is hard to see anything other than a reinforcement of the movement toward nationalism, great-power rivalry, strategic decoupling, and the like.

在短期内，这场危机将为西方大战略辩论中的所有阵营提供动力。鉴于正在遭受的经济破坏和社会崩溃，除了加强民族主义、大国竞争、战略脱钩等行动外，几乎看不到其他任何东西。

But just like in the 1930s and ’40s, there might also be a slower-evolving countercurrent, a sort of hardheaded internationalism similar to the one that Franklin D. Roosevelt and a few other statesmen began to articulate before and during the war. The 1930s collapse of the world economy showed how connected modern societies were and how vulnerable they were to what FDR called contagion. The United States was less threatened by other great powers than by the deep forces—and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde character—of modernity. What FDR and other internationalists conjured was a postwar order that would rebuild an open system with new forms of protection and capacities to manage interdependence. The United States couldn’t simply hide within its borders, but to operate in an open postwar order required the building of a global infrastructure of multilateral cooperation.

但是，就像1930年代和40年代一样，逆潮流的发展可能也较慢，这是一种顽固的国际主义，类似于富兰克林·罗斯福和其他一些政治家在战前和战时阐述的那种国际主义。1930年代世界经济的崩溃表明现代社会之间是如何联系的，以及它们在罗斯福所称的传染病面前是如此脆弱。美国受到其他大国的威胁要少于受到如“变身怪医”般的现代性的强大力量威胁。罗斯福和其他国际主义者想到的是战后世界秩序，它将重建一个具有新形式的保护和管理相互依存能力的开放体系。美国不能仅仅躲藏在其边界内，而要按照战后的开放秩序开展行动，这就需要建立全球性的多边合作基础设施机制。

So the United States and other Western democracies might travel through this same sequence of reactions driven by a cascading sense of vulnerability; the response might be more nationalist at first, but over the longer term, the democracies will come out of their shells to find a new type of pragmatic and protective internationalism.

因此，美国和其他西方国家可能会经历同样的一系列反应，这种反应是由喷薄而出的脆弱性所驱动的。其回应最初可能是民族主义，但从长远来看，西方国家会摆脱困境，找到一种新型的实用主义和保护性国际主义。

5

Lower Profits, but More Stability

收益更低、但更稳定

Shannon K. O’Neil, 美国外交关系协会拉丁美洲研究高级研究员

https://www.as-coa.org/watchlisten/video-book-launch-two-nations-indivisible-mexico-united-states-and-road-ahead

COVID-19 is undermining the basic tenets of global manufacturing. Companies will now rethink and shrink the multistep, multicountry supply chains that dominate production today.

COVID-19正在破坏全球制造业的基本原则。一些公司将重新考虑并缩小如今主导生产的多步骤、多国家供应链。

Global supply chains were already coming under fire—economically, due to rising Chinese labor costs, U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war, and advances in robotics, automation, and 3D printing, as well as politically, due to real and perceived job losses, especially in mature economies. COVID-19 has now broken many of these links: Factory closings in afflicted areas have left other manufacturers—as well as hospitals, pharmacies, supermarkets, and retail stores—bereft of inventories and products.

全球供应链已在经济和政治上受到冲击。在经济上，这是由于中国劳动力成本上涨，特朗普的贸易战，以及机器人技术、自动化和3D打印技术的进步。在政治上，这是由于实际和可感知的失业增长，特别是在成熟经济体中。疫情已在不同方面打破了全球供应链的纽带，例如受灾地区的工厂关闭使其他制造商以及医院、药房、超级市场和零售商店的库存和产品流失。

On the other side of the pandemic, more companies will demand to know more about where their supplies come from and will trade off efficiency for redundancy. Governments will intervene as well, forcing what they consider strategic industries to have domestic backup plans and reserves. Profitability will fall, but supply stability should rise.

在大流行的另一面，更多公司将要求更了解其供应来源，并以效率为代价予以折衷。各国政府也将进行干预，迫使那些被其视作“战略性”的行业制定国内后备计划和储备。盈利能力将下降，但供应稳定性会提高。

6

This Pandemic Can Serve a Useful Purpose

这次大流行能够发挥有益作用

Shivshankar Menon，美国布鲁金斯学会印度中心研究员，曾任印度总理曼莫汉·辛格的国家安全顾问

https://theprint.in/walk-the-talk/need-to-take-an-extra-step-maintain-new-equilibrium-with-china-menon/83307/

It is early days yet, but three things seem apparent. First, the coronavirus pandemic will change our politics, both within states and between them. It is to the power of government that societies—even libertarians—have turned. Government’s relative success in overcoming the pandemic and its economic effects will exacerbate or diminish security issues and the recent polarization within societies. Either way, government is back.

疫情目前还处于初期，但有三件事已趋于明朗。首先，大流行将改变我们的国家内政治与国家间政治。政府在克服大流行及其经济影响方面的相对成功将加剧或减少安全问题以及近期社会内部的两极分化。无论是哪种方式，政府力量都重回人们视线。

Secondly, this is not yet the end of an interconnected world. The pandemic itself is proof of our interdependence. But in all polities, there is already a turning inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate. We are headed for a poorer, meaner, and smaller world.

其次，这不是互联世界的终结。大流行本身就是我们相互依存的证明。但是在所有政治体中，已经有了内化，寻求自主权和对自身命运控制权的出现。我们将走向一个更贫穷，更卑鄙和更小的世界。

Finally, there are signs of hope and good sense. India took the initiative to convene a video conference of all South Asian leaders to craft a common regional response to the threat. If the pandemic shocks us into recognizing our real interest in cooperating multilaterally on the big global issues facing us, it will have served a useful purpose.

最后，也存在着希望和善意的态度。印度主动召开了一次所有南亚领导人参与的电视会议，以期就该威胁达成共同的区域应对措施。如果这种流行病使我们认识到我们真正感兴趣的是在我们面临的全球性大问题上进行多边合作，那么它将起到有益的作用。

7

American Power Will Need a New Strategy

美国权力需要一种新战略

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.，“软实力”之父，曾任哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院院长，卡特政府的副国务卿帮办、克林顿政府的助理国防部长及国家情报委员会主席

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/668619.html

In 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a new national security strategy that focuses on great-power competition. COVID-19 shows this strategy to be inadequate. Even if the United States prevails as a great power, it cannot protect its security by acting alone.

2017年，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普宣布了一项侧重于大国竞争的新国家安全战略。COVID-19的爆发则显示出这一战略的不充分性。即使美国以大国之姿主宰（世界），也不能通过单独行动来保护自身安全。

On transnational threats like COVID-19 and climate change, it is not enough to think of American power over other nations. The key to success is also learning the importance of power with others. Every country puts its national interest first; the important question is how broadly or narrowly this interest is defined. COVID-19 shows we are failing to adjust our strategy to this new world.

对于像COVID-19和气候变化这样的跨国威胁，仅仅考虑美国相对于其他国家的力量是不够的。成功的关键还在于与他者共同认识到权力的重要性。每个国家都将国家利益放在首位，但重要的问题是对这种利益的界定是广义的还是狭义的。目前表明，美国未能制定与新世界相适应的国家战略。

8

The History of COVID-19 Will Be Written by the Victors

历史将由胜利者书写

John Allen，国布鲁金斯学会现任主席，曾任美国海军陆战队四星将军，北约国际安全援助部队和驻阿富汗美军的前司令官

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:120209-D-VO565-006_-_John_R._Allen.jpg

As it has always been, history will be written by the “victors” of the COVID-19 crisis. Every nation, and increasingly every individual, is experiencing the societal strain of this disease in new and powerful ways. Inevitably, those nations that persevere—both by virtue of their unique political and economic systems, as well as from a public health perspective—will claim success over those who experience a different, more devastating outcome.

一如既往，历史将由危机的“胜利者”来书写。每个国家，越来越多的个体，都以全新且强有力的方式经历着这种疾病的社会压力。不可避免地，相较之那些经历了不同且更具破坏性的结果的国家，那些凭借其独特的政治和经济制度以及从公共卫生的角度出发而坚持不懈抗击疫情的国家，将宣布取得更大的成功。

Either way, this crisis will reshuffle the international power structure in ways we can only begin to imagine. COVID-19 will continue to depress economic activity and increase tension between countries. Over the long term, the pandemic will likely significantly reduce the productive capacity of the global economy, especially if businesses close and individuals detach from the labor force. This risk of dislocation is especially great for developing nations and others with a large share of economically vulnerable workers. The international system will, in turn, come under great pressure, resulting in instability and widespread conflict within and across countries.

无论是哪种方式，这场危机都将以难以预料的方式对国际权力结构进行重新洗牌。此次危机将继续抑制经济活动并加剧国家间的紧张关系。从长远来看，这种流行病很可能会大大降低全球经济的生产能力，尤其是在企业关闭和个人脱离劳动力的情况下。这种错位的风险对发展中国家和其他经济脆弱且工人比例较大的国家尤其巨大。在这一力量的作用下，国际体系将承受巨大压力，从而导致国家内部和国家之间出现不稳定和广泛冲突。

9

A Dramatic New Stage in Global Capitalism

全球资本主义的崭新舞台

Laurie Garrett，前美国对外关系委员会全球卫生高级研究员，曾获普利策奖的科学作家

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laurie_Garrett

The fundamental shock to the world’s financial and economic system is the recognition that global supply chains and distribution networks are deeply vulnerable to disruption. The coronavirus pandemic will therefore not only have long-lasting economic effects, but lead to a more fundamental change.

这次疫情对世界金融和经济体系的根本冲击在于，人们认识到全球供应链和分销网络极易受到破坏。因此，疫情大流行不仅将产生长期的经济影响，而且将带来更根本的变化。

Globalization allowed companies to farm out manufacturing all over the world and deliver their products to markets on a just-in-time basis, bypassing the costs of warehousing. Inventories that sat on shelves for more than a few days were considered market failures. Supply had to be sourced and shipped on a carefully orchestrated, global level. COVID-19 has proven that pathogens can not only infect people but poison the entire just-in-time system.

全球化使公司可以在全球范围内进行生产，并将产品及时交付市场，从而避免了仓储成本。搁置超过几天的库存被视作是市场失败。供应必须在精心策划的全球范围内进行采购和运输。COVID-19已证明，病原体不仅可以感染人，而且会毒害整个即时系统。

Given the scale of financial market losses the world has experienced since February, companies are likely to come out of this pandemic decidedly gun-shy about the just-in-time model and about globally dispersed production. The result could be a dramatic new stage in global capitalism, in which supply chains are brought closer to home and filled with redundancies to protect against future disruption. That may cut into companies’ near-term profits but render the entire system more resilient.

鉴于自2月以来世界经历的金融市场损失规模之大，商业公司很可能试图从这种大流行中摆脱出来，对即时模型和分布于全球的生产模式持保守态度。结果可能是全球资本主义出现了一个戏剧性的新阶段，在这一阶段中供应链离本土更近，并储备冗余以防止未来的破坏。这可能会削减公司的短期利润，但会使整个系统更具弹性。

10

More Failed States

更多失败国家

Richard N. Haass，自2003年起担任美国对外关系委员会主席，曾担任美国国务院政策规划主任，前国务卿克林·鲍威尔的资深幕僚

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yY_q5iPSsh0

Permanent is not a word I am fond of, as little or nothing is, but I would think the coronavirus crisis will at least for a few years lead most governments to turn inward, focusing on what takes place within their borders rather than on what happens beyond them. I anticipate greater moves toward selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, decoupling) given supply chain vulnerability; even greater opposition to large-scale immigration; and a reduced willingness or commitment to tackle regional or global problems (including climate change) given the perceived need to dedicate resources to rebuild at home and deal with economic consequences of the crisis.

永久不是我（Haass本人）喜欢的词，可以说是很少或根本不喜欢。但是冠状病毒危机至少会在几年内导致大多数政府对内转向，即专注于其国土边界内，而非外部世界所发生的事情。鉴于供应链的脆弱性，这些国家预期将出现这些趋势：经济上朝着选择性的自给自足（以及随之而来的脱钩）迈出更大的步伐；对大规模移民的更大反对；鉴于人们认为需要将资源专用于家庭重建和应对危机的经济后果，解决区域或全球问题（包括气候变化）的意愿或承诺进一步降低。

I would expect many countries will have difficulty recovering from the crisis, with state weakness and failed states becoming an even more prevalent feature of the world. The crisis will likely contribute to the ongoing deterioration of Sino-American relations and the weakening of European integration. On the positive side, we should see some modest strengthening of global public health governance. But overall, a crisis rooted in globalization will weaken rather than add to the world’s willingness and ability to deal with it.

预计有许多国家将难以从危机中恢复，而国家的软弱和失败的国家将成为世界上更加普遍的特征。这场危机可能会加剧中美关系的持续恶化和欧洲一体化的减弱。从积极的一面看，我们应该看到全球公共卫生治理有所加强。但是总的来说，植根于全球化的危机将削弱而不是增加世界的应对意愿和能力。

11

The United States Has Failed the Leadership Test

美国未能通过领导力测试

Kori Schake, 国际战略研究所副所长；在美国国防部和国务院以及国家安全委员会担任多个高级职务；曾担任2008年麦凯恩-佩林总统大选的外交政策顾问

https://www.theapricity.com/forum/showthread.php?265047-Classify-German-Dr-Kori-Schake

The United States will no longer be seen as an international leader because of its government’s narrow self-interest and bungling incompetence. The global effects of this pandemic could have been greatly attenuated by having international organizations provide more and earlier information, which would have given governments time to prepare and direct resources to where they’re most needed. This is something the United States could have organized, showing that while it is self-interested, it is not solely self-interested. Washington has failed the leadership test, and the world is worse off for it.

由于美国政府狭隘的自私自利和无所作为，美国将不再被视作国际领导。通过让国际组织提供更多和更早的信息，可以大大减轻这种流行病的全球影响，这将使政府有时间准备并将资源定向到最需要的地方。这是美国本可以组织的事情，尽管这也是基于自身利益的考虑，但不仅仅是一种自利行为。华盛顿未能通过领导力测试，因此世界变得更加糟糕。

12

In Every Country, We See the Power of the Human Spirit

在每个国家，我们都看到了人性的力量

Nicholas Burns，哈佛大学约翰肯尼迪政府学院外交与国际政治实践教授；美国前外交官

https://europe.columbia.edu/news/ei-lecture-ambassador-r-nicholas-burns

The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest global crisis of this century. Its depth and scale are enormous. The public health crisis threatens each of the 7.8 billion people on Earth. The financial and economic crisis could exceed in its impact the Great Recession of 2008-2009. Each crisis alone could provide a seismic shock that permanently changes the international system and balance of power as we know it.

这次疫情大流行是本世纪以来最大的全球危机。它的深度和规模是巨大的。公共卫生危机威胁着地球上78亿人口中的每一个。金融和经济危机的影响可能超过2008-2009年的大衰退。众所周知，每场危机都会给世界带来震动，这将永久改变国际体系和力量平衡。

To date, international collaboration has been woefully insufficient. If the United States and China, the world’s most powerful countries, cannot put aside their war of words over which of them is responsible for the crisis and lead more effectively, both countries’ credibility may be significantly diminished. If the European Union cannot provide more targeted assistance to its 500 million citizens, national governments might take back more power from Brussels in the future. In the United States, what is most at stake is the ability of the federal government to provide effective measures to stem the crisis.

迄今为止，国际合作严重不足。如果美国和中国这两个世界上最强大的国家不能搁置关于谁应该对这场危机负责和更有效领导的问题的口水战，那么两国的信誉可能会大大降低。如果欧盟不能为其5亿公民提供更有针对性的援助，将来各国政府可能会从布鲁塞尔收回更多权力。在美国，联邦政府提供有效措施来遏制危机的能力正经受考验。

In every country, however, there are many examples of the power of the human spirit—of doctors, nurses, political leaders, and ordinary citizens demonstrating resilience, effectiveness, and leadership. That provides hope that men and women around the world can prevail in response to this extraordinary challenge.

但是，在每个国家/地区，都有许多体现人性力量的例子-医生、护士、政治领导人和普通公民都表现出了韧性、效力和领导能力。这为人们提供了希望，相信世界各地的男性和女性可以共同应对这一非凡挑战。

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（Cambridge China Centre）

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